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Abstract
‘Smart cities’ has become a hegemonic concept in urban discourses, despite substantial criticism presented by scholarly
research and activism. The aim of this research was to understand what happens when one of the big digital corpora-
tions enters the field of real estate and land use development and urban planning, how existing institutions respond to
this, and how modes of urban governance are affected. Alphabet Inc.’s plans for Toronto’s waterfront provided insights
into these questions. Our investigations traced a complex web of place-making practices that involved all levels of gov-
ernment, the general public, and networks of actors throughout the private sector. Methodologically, the discourse was
reconstructed with local fieldwork, interviews with key actors, participating in tours and public meetings, and secondary
sources. It was found that Alphabet Inc.’s plan to build a world-class digital city contained some lessons for urban studies
and urban planning practice. First, Alphabet Inc.’s plans, which unfolded amidst initiatives to expand the knowledge econ-
omy, confirmed concerns that the trajectory of neoliberal, market-driven land use and speculation along the waterfront
remains unchanged. Second, digital infrastructures are potentially a Trojan Horse. Third, it was seen thatmunicipalities and
their modes of urban planning are vulnerable to the political economic manoeuvrings of large corporate power. Fourth,
Alphabet Inc. operates as a post-political package driven by a new coalition of politics, where the smart city is sold as a
neutral technology. The controversies surrounding the project, however, stirred a civic discourse that might signal a return
of the political.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to demonstrate what hap-
pens when one of the big digital corporations enters
the field of land use development and urban plan-
ning. We are particularly interested in how public in-
stitutions respond to such developments and how the
usual modes of urban governance and planning are im-
pacted. The case of Alphabet Inc.’s plans for develop-
ing the Port Lands district of the City of Toronto (the
City), Canada, provided excellent insight into these ques-
tions. In 2017, Sidewalk Labs (SL)—a daughter company
and urban development arm of Alphabet Inc. and sis-
ter to Google LLC—won the competition to develop 4.9
hectares along Toronto’s shores of Lake Ontario. The
project, known as Quayside, grabbed substantial media
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attention; however, observers also wondered about the
implications for urban planning practices and modes of
urban governance both there and everywhere, because
never before had a world leader in technological innova-
tion of such scale ever attempted to make in-roads into
the field of urban planning, as urban developers.
Our background research began in 2017 and
coincided—as did the announcement about Quayside—
with the hype around urban digitalization that had ren-
dered the smart city into a powerful and hegemonic
concept, or imaginary, in urban planning (Sadowski &
Bendor, 2019). Such hype was propagated, for example,
by the Royal Town Planning Institute (2017) in the UK,
which wrote about the future smart city as the answer
to far-reaching challenges facing citymanagers, planners,
and residents. Similarly, Bitkom e.V. and Fraunhofer IESE
(2019) released an overview of over 50 German cities
showcasing smart city agendas. Just about any city that
had implemented any kind of digital device or system
(such as traffic lights or driverless cars) was now clas-
sified as smart. And, there are meanwhile entire cities
being built across Asia based on smart city principles
(Hollands, 2015).
Along with scholars such as Ash, Kitchin, and
Leszczynski (2016), Kitchin (2015), orWiig (2018),we con-
tend that there are unexpected consequences and exter-
nalities associated with the rise of smart cities and urban
digitalization. These are not critical assessments of tech-
nology itself, as technological determinism and the com-
plex relationship between urban development, urban
planning, politics, and innovation are well understood.
Rather, contemporary urban studies literature addresses
broader debates about themodes, discourses, contradic-
tions, and socio-political and economic processes that
constitute geography’s ‘digital turn’ (Ash et al., 2016;
Graham, Kitchin, Mattern, & Shaw, 2019; Hajer, 2015;
Karvonen, Cugurullo, & Caprotti, 2019; Kitchin, 2015).
Several unsolved problems with the smart city
model have been documented (Cardullo, di Feliciantonio,
& Kitchin, 2019; Glasmeier & Christopherson, 2015;
Hollands, 2008, 2015; Kitchin, 2015; Shelton, Zook, &
Wiig, 2015). These include questions about: (1) the epis-
temologies that inform data production; (2) ownership
and regulation of data processed in remote geographic
locations; (3) the problem of smart city agendas driven
by companies who see cities as burgeoning markets for
their digital products; and (4) the commodification of
public services, lock-in effects, and consequences of stan-
dardization. With respect to Alphabet Inc., specifically,
Tomlinson et al. (2010, p. 188) concluded that Google’s
search engines produced a hegemony of urban plan-
ning concepts that excluded “alternative perspectives
and policy options.” Observing Google Fiber’s provision
of infrastructure in Kansas City, Alizadeh, Grubesic, and
Helderop (2017, p. 984) concluded that “urban govern-
ments need to develop a suite of operational checks and
balances to assure the equity of access to service in their
dealings with big corporations.” These findings deliver
important insights into questions about how intermin-
gled governments and large digital corporations should
be, andwhere the lines between themought to be drawn
(Alizadeh et al., 2017, p. 974), given the costs and oppor-
tunities of enlisting the services of large digital corpora-
tions and the need for cities to keep pace with techno-
logical change despite limited resources (Alizadeh et al.,
2017; Caprotti, 2018; Haarstad, 2017; Rossi, 2016; Wiig
& Wyly, 2016).
Toronto’s waterfront development exhibits a new in-
carnation of digital cities: an urban development model
that is driven by a single large digital corporation, while
local public policy is situated in a vacuum. Our research
shows that the Quayside project was put onto Toronto’s
urban planning agenda by means that were neither
transparent, nor driven by urban policy and planning.
The mode of urban governance was thus post-political,
as defined by Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014) and re-
flected in the works of Davidson and Iveson (2015), Deas
(2014), Legacy (2018), MacLeod (2011), Mouffe (2005),
and others. In our research, the post-political reading of
Toronto’s urban governance is exemplified by a cleft be-
tween politics and the political, and is evidenced by the
strategic behaviour and the lack of communication on
the part of governing authorities in charge of land use
and urban planning. This article, on one hand, thus ex-
plains the case of Quayside as a cautionary tale to ur-
ban planners and development practitioners concerned
with the limits of smart city models. On the other hand,
this article also explains Quayside as yet another form of
post-political urban development, and thus contributes
to urban studies scholarship that conceptualises contem-
porary urbanity.
The argument is organized as follows. First, we in-
troduce the conceptual lens of post-political governance,
which magnifies the changes in urban policy-making and
politics, when big corporations like Alphabet Inc. enter
the field of urbanplanning anddevelopment. Second,we
explain the methodology, comprising of mainly of non-
standardized methods of inquiry such as document anal-
yses, in-depth expert interviews and participant observa-
tion at community meetings. Third, the case of Quayside
is presented, situated in the context of a new phase in
Toronto’s waterfront development. Here, SL’s alignment
with Canadian politics is seen, as are the possibilities and
limitations of a political civic response. Fourth, conclu-
sions aremade concerning the key lessons for urbanplan-
ning and urban studies scholarship.
2. Urban Governance and Post-Political Developments
One of the big debates in urban studies scholarship con-
cerns the changes in governance configurations and re-
lated practices that have taken shape in urban regions
across Europe and North America in recent decades
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Throughout the years,
cities—or better, city-regions—have become more and
more integrated into global production networks as
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hot spots in the emerging services industries, and re-
configured as strategic, competitive locales for cognitive-
cultural capitalism (Krueger, Gibbs, & Carr, 2018; Scott,
2001). In terms of urban governance, most notable
changes include the rise of corporate power within a
neoliberal framework, a related shift from managerial
to entrepreneurial urbanism, and an increasingly com-
petitive positioning of urban politics (McCann, 2017,
pp. 313–314). Broadly speaking, these changes triggered
the current configuration of many cities as “crucial sites
in the circulation of capital, culture and mobile policy”
(MacLeod, 2011, p. 2632). MacLeod claims that cities
have become:
Glittering commercial citadels…of iconic develop-
ment…[with] globally mediated bidding process[es]
to host prestige exhibitions and magnetic arts, cul-
tural and sporting venues and events…[often trans-
forming] former industrial inner-city zones intomixed-
use creative cultural quarters, buzzing economic dis-
tricts, heritage and tourism villages and gentrified
apartments…orchestrated by state-led coalitions and
special-purpose agencies whose aim is to boost urban
economies amid a quicksilver globalising capitalism.
(MacLeod, 2011, p. 2630)
Indeed, previous studies of Toronto’s urban develop-
ment informed MacLeod’s (2011) observations above.
And, as confirmed elsewhere, Toronto’s condominium
boom (Rosen &Walks, 2014), transit developments (Keil
& Addie, 2016), and mega event plans (Bellas & Oliver,
2016) have all been described as post-political processes.
Certainly, this article adds to this area-based inventory
of post-political processes in Toronto, and furthers other
debates that examine the (im)possibility of the political
in cities (Beveridge & Koch, 2017; Davidson & Iveson,
2015; Deas, 2014; Gray, 2018; Kenis & Lievens, 2017;
Legacy, 2018; Mössner, 2016; Paddison, 2009; Richter &
Fitzpatrick, 2018; Swyngedouw, 2011).
Informed by critical analyses of cities and urban
spaces from around the globe, scholarly debates shed
light on post-political developments, as a means of un-
derstanding the fuzzy practices situated between the
power of big politics and the characteristically messy po-
litical processes. Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014) pro-
vide a useful starting point for understanding both the
origins of the concept as well as one pole of the heated
scholarly discussion. They conceived the post-political in
terms of a Lacanian Borromean Knot, i.e., intertwined
registers of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, whereby
one cannot be separated outwithout unravelling the oth-
ers, and together the registers constitute dimensions of
the post-political. In short, the Imaginary can be under-
stood as the production of overarching narratives that
function to supplant all dissent with a higher priority
(Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). Wilson and Swyngedouw
(2014, p. 7) used the example of the “end of history”
narrative as one that sanctified the new global capitalist
order. The Symbolic is when politics is reduced to con-
sensual management, and the idea, memory, or notion
of deliberation is merely invoked but not practiced. The
Real refers to the ontological elimination of difference
across political spheres (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014).
There are careful, if not contested, definitions to
recall here (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014): The politi-
cal is “the space of contestation and agonistic engage-
ment” while politics refers to the “technocratic mech-
anisms and consensual procedures that operate within
an unquestioned framework of representative democ-
racy, free market economics, and cosmopolitan liberal-
ism” (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 6). In post-politics:
Political contradictions are reduced to policy prob-
lems to be managed by experts and legitimated
through participatory processes in which the scope
of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in advance.
‘The people’—as a potentially disruptive political
collective—is replaced by the population—the aggre-
gated object of opinion polls, surveillance, and bio-
political optimisation. Citizens become consumers,
and elections are framed as just another ‘choice.’
(Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 6)
For Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014), Chantal Mouffe
is one of the key thinkers of post-politics. According
to Mouffe (2005), political adversity—antagonism—is a
necessary component of functioning democracies; how-
ever, this is repressed in post-democratic regimes as pol-
itics strives for hegemony, while the political strives to
subvert it. Some have observed this, for example, in ur-
ban regeneration initiatives that claim to be progressive,
calling for local participation and collaboration, but are
void of debate and contestation (see Gray, 2018). We ar-
gue that Quayside represents a classic case of Mouffe’s
(2005) condition of the post-political where deliberation
is void of oppositional debate (Wilson & Swyngedouw,
2014), and politics is severed from the political (Mouffe,
2005). This split between politics and the political was
a key feature of Toronto’s and Canada’s dealings with
Alphabet Inc. This invokes the first lesson for urban plan-
ning practice—that processes are opaque—and a second
lesson about the character of (post-)politics when pow-
erful corporations want to do urban development.
There is a second current in the post-political litera-
ture that is also instructive. Authors, here, are concerned
with “the post-political trap” (Beveridge & Koch, 2017).
These authors argue that the prevailing binary of poli-
tics and political potentially occludes both the plurality
of “actually existing multiplicity of voices and forms of
contestation” (Kenis, 2019, p. 833), and by extension, the
urban as a setting for resistance (Kenis, 2019). Richter
and Fitzpatrick (2018) challenge the concept that post-
politics is a condition that merely unfolds unimpeded: If
politics has merely sanitized the political, then it is diffi-
cult to account for actual movements of resistance, com-
munity actions, or positions.
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In this article, we contend that big tech corporations
in general and smart city discourses in particular are
prone to pushing a neutral, expertise-led, technological
agenda that is post-political. However, we also see the
possible emergence of a realpolitik.When SL entered the
field of urban planning, it also sparked a resistance that
cannot be “written off as post-political” (Kern &McLean,
2017, p. 410). Legacy, Cook, Rogers, and Ruming (2018,
p. 2) are helpful here: “Post-political theorists claim that
formal, state-created processes and spaces for participa-
tion increasingly offer no grounds for actual public de-
bate, nor legitimate spaces for contestation.” While SL
became a central actor in Toronto urban planning along-
side Canadian politics, urban residents established new
spaces to engage in the political (see Legacy, 2018, p. 77).
3. The Research Approach
The research began in 2017 (Carr & Hesse, 2019), when
Waterfront Toronto (WT)—the agency in charge of prop-
erty development along the lakeside and in the Port
Lands—announced that SL won its competition to de-
velop Quayside (Figure 1). At this point in time, big tech
corporations had already gained some attention con-
cerning their possible stakes in urban development, par-
ticularly after Amazon.com instigated a competition for
the location of its second headquarters (HQ2; Nager,
Lowe Reed, & Langford, 2019). The announcement that
Alphabet Inc. was interested in developing Toronto’s wa-
terfront signalled another opportunity to examine what
happens to urban governance processes when large cor-
porations from the digital economy get involved.
To comprehend the complexities of urban politics in
Toronto—Canada’s most populous city—and around a
project such as Quayside, the research focused on both
the contextuality of SL’s arrival on Toronto’s urban plan-
ning and development scene, and the processuality of
Toronto’s urbanization. The latter has roots in urban polit-
ical ecology as developed by scholars such as Keil (2003),
Bunce and Desfor (2007), and Angelo and Wachsmuth
(2014), who draw on Lefebvre (2003) and focus on the
processes of production as constitutive of urban change,
because, as Keil (2003, p. 725) articulates it, “‘the ur-
ban’ is a complex, multiscale and multidimensional pro-
cess where the general and specific aspects of the hu-
man condition meet.” We thus applied a qualitative re-
search approach common in both human geography and
urban studies as ameans of understanding and analyzing
urban politics and political processes (see Kenis, 2019;
Mössner, 2016). The research design “aimed to arrive at
a thick and rich description of the discourses developed
by…participants” active in the field (Kenis, 2019, p. 836).
While Kenis (2019) sought to tease out the various dis-
courses of two different activist movements, our work
aimed at identifying and reconstructing the different dis-
courses produced by both politics and the political.
Secondary sources were central in understanding the
situation in broad strokes and for identifying key actors
and institutions. A wide variety of media outlets and doc-
uments were available for assessment. There was also a
wealth of videos available on the internet, such as record-
ings of public events organized by SL or WT, interviews
with politicians, or public announcements. SL also has
a significant number of relevant videos on its dedicated
website, Sidewalktoronto.ca.
The next step entailed exploring the site, meeting
key actors in the field, and triangulating their narra-
tives against the written discourse. Working in collabo-
ration with local institutions, Carr spent a total of three
months in downtown Toronto: four weeks in the spring
of 2019, and eight weeks in early autumn, 2019. During
this time, Carr, who had also lived in the waterfront dis-
trict (the St. Lawrence Neighbourhood) for 20 years, was
able to update prior knowledge of socio-political and
institutional structures in the area, and build that into
the study.
On-site research includedmeetings with scholarly ex-
perts knowledgeable of Torontonian social movements,
urban planning and development practices, legalities of
land use, local political processes and institutions of poli-
tics, and urban transformation along the waterfront and
in the Port Lands. A total of ten voluntary, circa hour-long
conversations were held. While it was always clear that
this was a research trip, Carr was on friendly terms with
most of the participants and the conversations were in-
formal in character (recall Mössner, 2016). The goal of
these conversations was to not only learn about the con-
temporary Toronto context and receive direction or hints
towards further readings or key players, but also to assist
in orienting in the written discourse and act as sounding
boards for ideas and interpretations.
During the first trip, on-site visits included a banquet
at the Four Seasons Hotel featuring a venture capitalist
speaker, one press conference at the Ontario Legislative
Building and one at Toronto City Hall, one community
meeting, and exhibitions held at SL’s office and exhibition
space, The 307. Quayside was a subject at all of these
venues. Like Kenis (2019, p. 836), Carr “was an active
participant amongst the other participants, taking part
in meetings…while at the same time maintaining a posi-
tion as a researcher.” Also, tours of the Port Lands were
taken with local residents. Methodologically, these tours
served as a kind of “walking interview [that] have been
demonstrated as a highly productive way of accessing a
local community’s connections to their surrounding en-
vironment. This is critical because [they reveal] people’s
relationships with place keys into contemporary policy is-
sues” (Evans & Jones, 2011, p. 856).
During the second trip, two further informal conver-
sations were held with scholarly experts, and two ad-
ditional professional tours were taken, one with an ur-
ban planner and one formal tour with on-site industry.
Around 20 invitations to participate in a research inter-
view were sent to real estate developers, City officials,
WT representatives, SL, journalists, activists, real estate
developers and business owners in the Port Lands. Four
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recorded conversations were held: one with a journal-
ist following the story, one with a representative of SL,
one with a Canadian business executive and one with
a community facilitation agency. These served to drill
down even further into the various discursive spheres.
The low response rate, i.e., from local officials (the City,
WT) was possibly reflective of the case: While Quayside
was receiving widespread international attention, it was
highly sensitive locally and some were hesitant to speak
on record. Indeed, not a single person from Toronto
City Hall or WT responded to requests for an interview.
Real estate developers were equally unresponsive. Two
activists also declined an interview citing their precari-
ous labour situation and perceiving research processes
as extractive.
4. A New Phase in Waterfront Development
4.1. A Short History
Toronto urban planning andwaterfront development has
been the subject of international scholarly debates in ur-
ban studies for decades and there is a rich literature to
draw upon (see Desfor & Laidley, 2011). Indeed, the wa-
terfront has been settled, stolen, bought, sold, drained,
dredged, filled, polluted, cleaned-up, channelled, indus-
trialized, abandoned, re-naturalized, festivalized, and re-
shaped continuously since its first surveying and use
as a military fort by the Lieutenant Governor of Upper
Canada, in 1793, and has always been an important cor-
nerstone of Toronto’s urban development. Throughout
the late 19th and 20th century, the waterfront was char-
acterized by technological innovations brought on by in-
dustrialization. In the early 1900s, with profits to be
earned by turning Toronto into a booming port city along
the St. Lawrence Seaway (Desfor & Laidley, 2011), the
federal government took control of the lakeside lands
and formed the Toronto Harbour Commission (THC) that
encouraged shipping and railway development in order
to transform the harbour into a bustling portmoving peo-
ple and goods, and enable economic growth (Desfor &
Laidley, 2011).
When industry declined in the latter decades of the
20th century, politicians from all levels of government
sought to transform the waterfront for new residential,
entertainment, and tourism activities (Lehrer & Laidley,
2008; Sanderson & Filion, 2011). Industries had closed
in response to the economic transformation, railways
were dismantled, the St Lawrence Neighbourhood was
built, and most recently, condominium towers were con-
structed that brought hundreds of thousands of new res-
idents to the area. This post-industrial phase can hardly
be captured in a single article. It has, however, been the
subject of many scholarly investigations such as those
fromBunce (2009, 2019), Desfor and Keil (2004), Keil and
Desfor (2010), Kipfer and Keil (2002), Laidley (2007), and
Lehrer, Keil, and Kipfer (2010), who recognized these re-
vitalization plans as modes of ecological modernization,
state-led green gentrification, globalization, and associ-
ated effects of urban inequality and exclusion.
This late 20th century transition was also marked by
new struggles between the federal, provincial, and mu-
nicipal governments, each of which wanted their stake
in the waterfront. Desfor and Laidley’s (2011) volume is
a rich resource of details on these institutional changes.
The point here is that the waterfront can be under-
stood as a struggle of multi-level governance (Hooghe
& Marks, 2001). Key institutional changes include the
federal government’s creation of the Royal Commission
on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront (RCFTW) in
1998 to address municipal-federal tensions. Learning
from the RCFTW that the THC was engaging less in port
functions and more in post-industrial land use activi-
ties, the federal government decided to replace the THC
by the Toronto Port Authority (TPA; Sanderson & Filion,
2011) increasing its influence. This was significant be-
cause although the THC was a federally run organiza-
tion, most of its board members were appointed by the
City (Sanderson & Filion, 2011); the new TPA, in con-
trast, consisted mainly of federal appointees (Sanderson
& Filion, 2011). Also in 1998, the three levels of govern-
ment established the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization
Corporation (TWRC)—a body that would represent all
governing interests and simultaneously “spark a ‘vir-
tuous cycle,’ attracting billions in private investment
from the companies and people fuelling key sectors of
the global economy…creating jobs and…tax revenues”
(Laidley, 2007, p. 260). The TWRC later became WT
which is now in charge of property development along
the waterfront (Figure 1). And, it would soon be recog-
nized for its “almost complete lack of disclosure of the
ways in which it spends public funds” (Lehrer & Laidley,
2008, p. 792).
4.2. A New Phase? The Waterfront as a Tech Hub
The development of the waterfront as the City’s hub of
technological development is rather recent (professional
tour of the Port Lands, August 2019; professional tour of
the waterfront, August 2019; tour with residents, April
2019, August, 2019). The Waterfront Innovation Centre
(WIC) is already under construction. With possible syn-
ergies with George Brown College Waterfront Campus
that specializes in health sciences—and is expanding its
premises with a timber-frame building by Moriyama &
Teshima Architects—the WIC will house more offices
of MaRS (a company providing meeting, office, and lab
spaces to start-ups) and theUniversity of Toronto (U of T).
MaRS and the U of T already work together support-
ing R&D and start-ups in fin-tech, clean tech, and health
science (U of T, 2018). MaRS (2019) already boasts rev-
enue in the billions, while the U of T boasts the forth-
coming Vector Institute for Artificial Intelligence that was
funded by a 100million $Can donation by philanthropists
Schwartz and Reisman (Fong, 2019). These plans to de-
velop Toronto as a hub of state-of-the-art technological
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Figure 1. Downtown Toronto waterfront (map by Malte Helfer, 2019).
development are also part of wider plans to expand the
knowledge economy (see Moos, Revington, Wilkin, &
Andrey, 2019). SL foresees its role at Quayside as an in-
cubator for further innovation and technological devel-
opment on the waterfront (interview with business exec-
utive, September 2019; interview with community facili-
tator, August 2019; interview with journalist, April 2019;
interview with representative from SL, August 2019).
5. Quayside Exposing Fractures across Politics and
the Political
While the production of the waterfront knowledge
economy—with SL at the helm—signals a new genera-
tion of waterfront development, it unfolds in the con-
text of Toronto’s pre-existing modes of urban planning
(interview with community facilitator, August 2019; in-
terview with journalist, April 2019; professional tour of
the Port Lands, August 2019). This article demonstrates
the post-political character of this process, discussing it
in regards to: (1) SL and its alignment with Canadian poli-
tics; and (2) the possibilities and limitations of a political
civic response.
5.1. SL and the Alignment of Canadian Politics
Figure 2 illustrates the key dates and publications sur-
rounding the procurement of SL. In the spring of 2017,
WT issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) and held an in-
ternational competition for an “innovation and funding
partner” (WT, 2017a, p. 6) at Quayside. In September
2017, the City of Toronto and WT (2017) published the
Port Lands Planning Framework (PLPF). This document
makes no reference to SL, but does mention (City of
Toronto &WT, 2017, p. ii) that the planning concepts con-
tained within it were the result of a collaborative process
between the City, WT, and a number of consulting firms
including Archaeological Services Inc., CH2MHill, Cicada
Design Inc., Dillon Consulting Ltd., Golder Associates,
Hemson Consulting, LURA, Performance Publications
Media Group, R.E Millward & Associates Ltd., and Urban
Strategies Inc. Closer inspection of these companies re-
veals that some of their employees now work at SL.
The same month, WT notified SL that they were “the
preferred proponent” (WT, 2019a). WT approved the
Framework Agreement (FA; WT, 2017b) on October 17,
2017 (WT, 2019a), and on October 18, 2017, a joint pub-
lic announcement was made by the Prime Minister, the
Premier of Ontario, the Mayor of Toronto, and the CEOs
ofWT, SL, and Alphabet Inc. (Valverde, 2018; WT, 2019a).
It was also noted that such an event would take care-
ful coordination:
I just know, as a journalist, that to get someone like
Eric Schmidt and Justin Trudeau on the same stage
at the same time is a difficult thing to do. So, you
need to have people who can really stage manage
and have close connections. (interview with journal-
ist, April 2019)
This was followed by SL’s (2017) widely marketed claims
that it would develop Quayside into the best digital city
ever: It would be “the first neighbourhood from the inter-
net up” (SL, 2017, p. 20). SL claimed that Quayside would
be fashioned with environmentally friendly, climate
positive buildings, which would be flexible and multi-
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Figure 2. Timeline of key dates and publications concerning the procurement of SL.
purpose. Garbage would be automatically removed, au-
tonomous vehicles would move people around, and sen-
sors would monitor air pollution. Quayside would aid in
economic development, by reducing the costs of govern-
ment administration, and it would be equitable, ensuring
that housing is affordable. The proposal was presented
as historic.
In December 2017, the Toronto City Council adopted
the PLPF (City of Toronto, 2019a) and endorsed the
precinct plans for Polson Quay, McCleary District, South
River, and Villier’s Island (sub-districts of the Port Lands).
These were consistent with the Official City Plan (OCP)
that viewed the Port Lands as “ripe for major growth”
(City of Toronto, 2019b, p. 4). Flynn and Valverde (2019)
note that this is the binding precinct city plan for the
Port Lands district. Generally, in Ontario, land use fol-
lows a multi-level governance set of land use planning
procedures. The City sets its vision of development, as-
signs land uses, sets the infrastructural framework (e.g.,
roads, waste management), and outlines these in its
OCP “the most important document for planning prac-
tice in contemporary Toronto” (Lehrer & Wieditz, 2009,
p. 92). The Ontario Planning Act (Government of Ontario,
2019), however, guarantees that the Province can inter-
vene in affairs that constitute one of their 19 domains
of “provincial interest” that are expressed in very broad
terms, such as the protection of natural resources, sup-
ply of infrastructure, sustainability, or climate change.
The Ontario government thus has a strong authority
over the municipalities. This can be traced back to the
British North America Act of 1867 (that established the
Dominion of Canada) and the Canadian Constitution of
1982, which gave jurisdiction to the provinces to create
new municipal institutions or redraw municipal bound-
aries without the consent of the municipalities them-
selves (Frisken, 2003).
The province has intervened numerous times to
change Toronto’s governing structure, such as the amal-
gamation of the City in 1998 (Frisken, 2003) and the re-
duction of the City Council in 2019 (Rider & Kopun, 2019).
This right to intervene remains a significant authority in
the story ofQuayside.While the City has planning author-
ity and the federal government defends its national inter-
est, the Premier of Ontario reserves a critical stance con-
cerning Quayside (Gray & Moore, 2019; interview with
journalist, April 2019).
While WT and the City were generating land use
plans, SL moved forward with town hall meetings and
public round tables. On July 31st, SL and WT (2018) re-
placed the FA with the Plan Development Agreement
(PDA), which Flynn and Valverde (2019, p. 773) described
as “a ‘plan to plan’ with no binding authority over what
happens in the 12-acre Quayside area.” The PDA did,
however, bind the SL to a 50 million US$ investment
into public outreach programs towards the development
of its Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP)
(SL & WT, 2018, p. 9). As stated in the PDA (SL & WT,
2018, p. 53), these were design jams, civic labs, neigh-
bourhood meetings, use of social media, and public
roundtables. SL also offered space for weekend Open
Houses in its offices at The 307. There, visitors could
observe models, engage with interactive programs ex-
plaining urban design, learn about the housing objec-
tives and the benefits of digital electricity or timber-
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frame architecture. Outside The 307, visitors could learn
about weather-mitigating building raincoats and hexago-
nal cobblestones with traffic controlling sensors (tour of
The 307, April 2019, August 2019).
While SL’s efforts in public outreach seemed im-
pressive compared with business-as-usual developer-led
urban planning (interview with community facilitator,
August 2019), it all had the veneer of a sales pitch. Most
messages praised how fabulous Toronto was, and how
SL’s products would only improve it. As Coletta (2019)
later quoted Michael Bryant from the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association (CCLA), people were “seduced by
the honey pot of Google’s sparkling brand and promises
of political and economic glory.”
Finally, in June 2019, SL released the 1,500-page,
4-volume, MIDP. It could be read on-site at The 307 or
downloaded from SL’s website, but hard copies were
not available for order (tour of The 307, August 2019).
It received considerable critique for being impossible
to digest by the public (Valverde & Flynn, 2019): “The
MIDP is not for reading,” Haggart (2019) commented.
The MIDP also indicated that SL wanted to develop
much more than the originally announced Quayside.
Effectively, SL wanted to build not a 4.9-hectare but
a 77-hectare Innovative Development and Economic
Acceleration District (SL, 2019a, 2019b) on municipal
precincts south and southeast of the Quayside property,
including Google’s Canadian headquarters on Villier’s
Island (SL, 2019a, p. 20).
By mid-2018, however, the Quayside project was
rather contested locally, and the MIDP, its bulk, and
the variety of surprises and unanswered questions, did
not quell the critical reaction. WT (2019a) produced a
“Note to the Reader” in what seemed like a feeble at-
tempt to assist the interested public in making sense of
the MIDP. Later, the new WT Board Chair, surprised ob-
servers with an open letter to the public, acknowledg-
ing that the MIDP included “a number of exciting ideas
that respond to challenges,” but distancing itself from
SL because there would be “very different perspectives”
such as the massive expansion beyond the Quayside
area (Diamond, 2019). The Chair also concluded that the
project had “stirred vigorous debate and, regardless of
the outcome, raises issues to consider.” It was a profound
distancing of a public agency from a planning proposal
of which itself was, in fact, in charge. WT then set an
October 31, 2019 deadline for SL to respond to unan-
swered questions. By early November 2019, WT (2019b,
p. 1) declared that it had found “alignmentwith SL on the
threshold issues [and that]WT’s Board of Directors unan-
imously decided tomove forwardwith the formal evalua-
tion of theMIDP” in consultation with their experts, who
include ARUP, Moriyama & Teshima Architects, Perkins
& Will Architects, Steer Davies & Gleave Ltd., N. Barry
Lyon Consultants Limited, and McCarthy Tétrault (WT,
2019c). Several of these agencies are already active in
other projects on the waterfront.
5.2. The Political Civic Response
Various authors have described the controversies around
Quayside (Flynn & Valverde, 2019; Haggart, 2019;
Tusikov, 2019a, 2019b; Valverde, 2018;Wylie, 2018). The
current civic reaction spans two polar opposites, from
fully against to fully in favour (interview with commu-
nity facilitator, August 2019). The latter are consistently
members or associates of SL such as Urban Strategies
Inc. or the Wellesley Institute (Berridge, 2019; Doctoroff,
2019;McKenzie, 2019). These argued that people should
not fear private companies, and that Torontonians ought
to seize the opportunity to improve the labour market
and foster economic growth. The Port Lands, according
to these authors, would be a hub of innovation and eco-
nomic activity that would place Toronto at the forefront
of technological innovation (Florida, 2019). Voices in the
middle ground are in favour as long as questions are an-
swered and SL is accountable to the public (interview
with community facilitator, August 2019).
Voices against Quayside began surfacing in early
2018. There were resignations and dismissals at WT, and
the CCLA filed a legal suit against WT and all three levels
of government arguing that the contractual agreements
with Alphabet Inc. on data governance were neither
in the public interest nor constitutional (interview with
business executive, September 2019; press conference
at the Ontario Legislative Building, April 2019). Later, for-
mer Toronto Chief Urban Planner came out with the crit-
icism that the plans offer no real solution to the housing
crisis (Keesmaat, 2019). Similarly, another City Councillor
spoke out against it, arguing that privately developed
cities cannot substitute democracy (Perks, 2019).
#Blocksidewalk was also launched as an informal
group of concerned residents, City Councillors, local
urban scholars, tech entrepreneurs, and city planners
(press conference at Toronto City Hall, April 2019). It
became one of the more vocal opponents of SL, with
the public interest as a key concern: “Development
should prioritize city needs first, not the needs and in-
terests of a private corporation” (Blocksidewalk, 2019).
The key points of dispute are summarized in Table 1.
The recurring themes are data governance, the prob-
lems of “rogue capitalism” as inspired by Zuboff (2019),
lack of transparency, trust, scale, political economic
disparity, tax avoidance, housing affordability, spa-
tial planning, labour market, public services, and eco-
nomic nationalism.
While wide in their scope, the source of the cri-
tiques focussed mainly on SL’s digital city concept and
associated array of digital services, which would require
developed surveillance infrastructure throughout the
development—including inside private quarters—to ob-
serve, and capitalize on, human behaviour (banquet at
the Four Seasons Hotel, April 2019; interview with busi-
ness executive, September 2019). SL attempted to quell
these concerns, and proposed a set of icons that would
indicate to users what kind of information they were col-
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Table 1. Key points of criticism concerning the Quayside project. Source: Blocksidewalk (2019).
Codes Quotes from #Blocksidewalk (2019)
data governance, rogue “Toronto [needs] digital governance practices that will serve the public interest. [These]
capitalism, public interest should [be] in place before committing to a partnership whose consequences we
can’t control.”
data governance, public “There is no option for residents, workers or visitors to opt out of ‘urban data’ collection,
interest and no safeguards for children….All Torontonians deserve the right to say no to
ubiquitous surveillance.”
lack of transparency, trust, “The project was [first] limited to a 12-acre area….Then, a leaked document revealed that
public interest they planned…450 acres….Now…they want 190 acres. SL isn’t…clear about their intentions.
Can they be trusted with our waterfront?”
scale, political economic “As residents, we can’t compete with SL’s enormous lobbying budget.”
disparity, public interest
tax avoidance, public “Google’s affiliates demand tax breaks for private real estate developments on top of
interest avoiding corporate taxes…global tech companies should pay their taxes, not profit
from ours.”
housing affordability, “Large tech developments drive up rents….Let’s learn from the mistakes of San Francisco,
spatial planning, public Seattle and New York City, where the cost of renting a home has outpaced even tech
interest workers’ salaries. Toronto needs a real affordable housing strategy. This isn’t it.”
labour market, public “More than half of Google’s global workforce is temporary or contract-based, which means
interest they earn less money and have no job security. [Furthermore], automation [may] threaten
good public sector jobs.”
data governance, public “SL wants to use surveillance technologies to change how Torontonians receive health
services, public interest, care….There are billions of dollars in profits to be made in health data and AI. We support
economic nationalism universal health care and think that American tech companies have no business running
our public health system.”
data governance “Surveillance practices actually harm low-income…and disabled people…vulnerable to
algorithmic bias.”
lecting. They also argued that on-site cameras would de-
identify data, decoupling collected data from personally
identifying data; however, not everyone was convinced
(Haggart, 2019; Tusikov, 2019a, 2019b; Wylie, 2018).
#Blocksidewalk’s concerns also targeted Alphabet’s
known business model, and lack of clarity on issues of
data storage and ownership. Venture capitalist Roger
McNamee condemned Google’s behavioural prediction
algorithms designed to steer behaviour to benefit their
business (banquet at the Four Seasons Hotel, April
2019). Harvard Professor Shoshanna Zuboff along with
Roger McNamee and Jim Balsillie, Director of the
Balsillie Institute of International Affairs at CIGI Campus,
Waterloo, testified as witnesses before the Canadian
Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy
and Ethics, as well as the International Grand Committee
on Big Data Privacy and Democracy, with critical com-
ments on Alphabet Inc.’s business model. Echoing these:
The fact that you would let a company such as Google
control your city data, data driven economy….You
know, all the alarms went off in my head. And,
I thought it was incredibly irresponsible on the part
of the political leaders…to dive into something so
naively with a powerful company, whose objective is
to undermine personal autonomy and sell that to the
highest bidder….It was an incredibly naive….When it
comes to data, the consumer of your data is another
corporation who is trading personal autonomy at the
corporate level. So, there is no consumer in this any-
more; it’s just business to another business. And, once
we lose personal autonomy, that’s it for democracy,
and that’s it for markets. So it’s a much more….It’s a
higher stakes game right now, because its irreversible.
(interview with business executive, September 2019)
These critical voices are either direct supporters of, or
inspirations to, the #Blocksidewalk campaign. To date,
#Blocksidewalk has over 1,000 members (Blocksidewalk,
2019), amassing a formidable force against the project,
and mobilizing the public to address the deeper im-
plications (interview with community facilitator, 2019).
They have regular public meetings and are active in so-
cial media. #Blocksidewalk, the CCLA lawsuit, and a few
prominent experts appear to be the main oppositional
forces. “I think they are going to be shown the door,”
said one interviewee (interview with business executive,
September 2019).
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6. Conclusion
Quayside represents the unprecedented case of a large-
scale digital corporation entering the field of urban plan-
ning, and aiming to control development over a piece of
urban space for its own business purposes. Amazon.com
has gained a reputation for its urban–regional imprint
that results from their parallel worlds of digital, logistical,
and locational operations (Hesse, 2018). Also, in his strik-
ing account of San Francisco and Bay Area,Walker (2019)
sketched, in broad terms, the long-term impacts that big
tech firms can have on urban–regional lifeworlds. The
case of Quayside, however, delivers important insights
about how public institutions respond to new large cor-
porate players in the field, and how modes of urban gov-
ernance and planning are affected. Quayside illuminates
challenges in urban planning and the kinds of relation-
ships that unfold. We argue that these relationships are
largely post-political, but that there is also the glimmer
of a possible return of the political.
6.1. Lessons for Urban Planning
There are three issues to which urban planning will
need to respond to if—or when—big tech corporations
enter the field of urban development. The first is an
area-based concern: Quayside is unfolding amidst a new
phase in Toronto’s waterfront development, namely as
a location for an expanded knowledge economy. These
are processes, too, that are closely connected to post-
industrial modes of development that prioritized global-
ization, privatized condominiums, state-led green gentri-
fication, and mega-event planning (Bellas & Oliver, 2016;
Bunce, 2019; Desfor & Keil, 2004; Desfor & Laidley, 2011;
Keil & Addie, 2016; Kipfer & Keil, 2002; Lehrer & Laidley,
2008; Moos et al., 2019; Rosen &Walks, 2014). Alphabet
Inc., as another developer on the field, demonstrated
that the trajectory of a neoliberal, market-driven land
use, speculation, and investment remains unchanged.
The second concerns the business model that more
and more big tech firms operate with. Much of the cri-
tique against SL—whether in the form of #Blocksidewalk,
the CCLA lawsuit, outspoken venture capitalists, or ob-
servant scholars such as Haggart (2019), Tusikov (2019a,
2019b), or Wylie (2018)—concerned data collection,
surveillance, the relationship between it and marketable
predictive algorithms, and the inability of legislation to
protect citizen rights. There were also concerns about
SL’s willingness to respond to public problems in housing,
transportation, labour market, and delivery of public ser-
vices and prioritize them over their profit-making strate-
gies. SL’s Quayside demonstrated that its business model
and vision of urban development does not prioritize the
public interest.
Third, Quayside exposed how municipalities and
their residents are vulnerable to the manoeuvrings of
large corporations. SL, the daughter firm of one of the
largest tech companies in theworld, aimed at taking over
planning functions normally left tomunicipal institutions,
such as staging town hall meetings, or theMIDP that was
disguised as, but not a replacement for—as it took Flynn
and Valverde (2019) to point out—a planning document.
As Flynn and Valverde (2019, p. 774) further argue:
This case…calls into question the degree to which
smart city pioneers like SL, who have a tremendous
amount of lobbying power and funding, make a play
not only for more data or more money, but for the
power to plan public space.
Alphabet Inc. exercised considerable pressure on lo-
cal governing institutions. Municipalities elsewhere thus
need to ask themselves if they have the sufficient re-
sources to adequately respond to large tech firms inways
that will protect their citizens’ rights and the integrity of
their institutions.
6.2. Lessons for Scholarly Debate
Several scholars have already come to the conclusion
that Toronto’s waterfront development is post-political
(Bellas & Oliver, 2016; Keil & Addie, 2016; MacLeod,
2011; Rosen & Walks, 2014). So far, Alphabet Inc. has
demonstrated that it operates within this governance
mode, and that the gap between politics and the political
is unlikely to be narrowed by their activity in the urban
planning scene.
First, post-politics is characterised by the reduction of
political contradictions to policy problems and manage-
rial processes (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). This was
the case at Quayside as SL and the Canadian government
(politics), together, aimed at neutralising urban planning
practices. The procurement and endorsement of SL at
Quayside was the outcome of networks of private firms,
WT, and the federal government. WT orchestrated the
RFP process in coordination with all three levels of gov-
ernment and a network of planning consulting firms. The
timeline of events and publications shows, too, how SL
and Canadian politics were in co-operation with one an-
other. That is, the urban planning agenda was set by pol-
itics through means that were neither transparent nor
steered by urban policy, planning, or public need.
Second, post-political managerial processes are le-
gitimated through a mirage of participatory processes
where the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly de-
fined (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). After SL was cho-
sen, it held information sessions in the form of town
hall meetings and civic jams, etc. These were glossy
events with high profile names/speakers where SL set
the agenda, choose speakers, and curated its audience.
On one hand, these events served as a means of deliver-
ing information to residents—but not to seek out what
was necessary or in demand. On the other hand, they
also served to groom SL’s image as a competent, expert
player in the field of urban development. Also character-
istic of the process was how information was communi-
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cated at a volume that was crippling for the public to di-
gest. Despite public messages articulated by prominent
voices, or the activity of groups like #Blocksidewalk, SL’s
only response to criticism was either silence or the pro-
duction of inaccessible planning documents. In sum, the
memory of deliberation was repeatedly invoked—this
is post-political in the Symbolic (Wilson & Swyngedouw,
2014)—yet SL’s efforts consistently offered neither space
for public debate or contestation, nor a guarantee for the
inclusion of a diversity of voices.
Alphabet Inc. continually strived for a hegemony in
Toronto’s urban planning discourse, which endorsed the
split between politics and the political that others have
already identified as characteristic of Toronto’s urban de-
velopment (Keil & Addie, 2016; MacLeod, 2011; Rosen &
Walks, 2014). However, a chorus of independent politi-
cal civic action groups did arise, raising awareness about
the potential negative impacts of SL and Quayside. As
Legacy et al. (2018) also observed in their work, this ac-
tion took place in spaces outside formal planning. It was
#Blocksidewalk, prominent venture capitalists, and the
CCLA that raised “fundamental questions about the fu-
ture of cities,…the allocation of resources, or the distri-
bution of goods and services” (Legacy et al., 2018). So,
while Toronto’s waterfront development as a hub in tech-
nological innovation is unfolding as an exercise of politics,
perhaps there is a glimmer of realpolitik, as these groups
filled the discursive void by raising pointed concerns that
were left unaddressed. Perhaps they marked a return to
the political that cannot be “written off” (Kern&McLean,
2017, p. 410).
When one of the big tech corporations enters the
field of real estate and land use development, it may
mark a newgeneration of post-political cities. If Quayside
is any indication, such cities will be run as a coalition of
big politics that do not respond to the public interest or
need, but to the business and profit-making interests of
politics. A civic political response is, however, still pos-
sible. Will the post-political gap close? Look further to
Quayside to find out.
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